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Testing Boundaries: Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar and the
Scope of R2P
JULIAN JUNK
On 3 May 2008, Cyclone Nargis hit the shores of Myanmar. The government of
Myanmar refused to grant international humanitarian relief efforts access to the
devastated regions. This triggered an impactful debate on whether aid should be delivered
coercively, and whether this was a case in which the principle of the Responsibility to
Protect (R2P) applied. This article traces the evolution of these disputes, as well as
their impact on the testing and delineation of the boundaries of R2P. The main impact
of the Myanmar debate was a return of R2P to its roots by re-centring the emerging
norm on the original four core crimes, excluding the consequences of natural disasters
and the delivery of humanitarian aid. Furthermore, in the Myanmar debate, the effective-
ness of the R2P frame in international coalition building was brought to its limits, with
some actors highlighting the potentially incendiary nature of using this frame. Hence,
this article argues that Myanmar proved to be the first test case for demarcating the
core of R2P.
Introduction
The evolution of international norms is not necessarily a linear process. Rather, their
development depends on their acceptance by coalitions of international actors.1 This
acceptance can vary greatly on a case-by-case basis, from widely shared consensus
on, to fierce contestation of, the application of a norm.2 Both consensual appli-
cation—be it in actual behavioural policy practice or discursive deliberation—and
contestation may make a decisive contribution to delineating the boundaries of a
norm.3 While a consensus about application has been the subject of much research,
norm contestation has received noticeably less scholarly attention.
1. See the introduction to this special issue. See also Philipp Rotmann, Gerrit Kurtz and Sarah Brock-
meier, “Major Powers and the Contested Evolution of a ‘Responsibility to Protect’”, Conflict, Security &
Development, Vol. 14, No. 4 (2014), pp. 355–377.
2. For norm contestation and resistance to norms, see, for instance, Antje Wiener, “Contested Mean-
ings of Norms: A Research Framework”, Comparative European Politics, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2007), pp. 1–17.
3. Nicole Deitelhoff, “Scheitert die Norm der Schutzverantwortung? Der Streit um Normbegründung
und Normanwendung der R2P”,Die Friedens-Warte: A Journal of International Peace and Organization, Vol.
88, Nos. 1–2 (2013), pp. 17–39. In the literature on international norms, scholars tend to focus on notions
of disappearing or eroding norms when they look at phenomena of non-application. As such, they do
not discuss the potential positive impact that might arise from non-application for the future trajectory
of a norm. Diana Panke and Ulrich Petersohn, “Why International Norms Disappear Sometimes”,
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This article investigates a case in which contestation prevailed and helped to
shape the trajectory of the evolution of a norm: the invocation of the “Responsibility
to Protect” (R2P) during the humanitarian crisis that unfolded in Myanmar4 after a
tropical storm hit its shores in 2008 and after the rulingmilitary authorities declined
access to international humanitarian aid. This article systematises the arguments of
both the supporters and opponents of R2P and traces the dispute’s impact on the
future development of the concept.
Two primary disputes stand out in the Myanmar case. First, there was a debate
about the scope of the norm, which relates, in essence, to the question of whether
the consequences of natural disasters fall under R2P, and to the point at which the
withholding of humanitarian aid passes the threshold of a manifest failure of the
Myanmar government to protect its own population. Second, arguments pointing
at the counterproductiveness of the R2P frame in political debates posed the ques-
tion of whether the reference to R2P in disputed cases leads to hardened political
fronts and serves as a political incendiary, consequently hurting the cause of
those advocating R2P. Interestingly, these arguments also served those sceptical
of pressuring the regime in Myanmar: by highlighting the incendiary nature of
the R2P discourse and by focusing the debate on the contested reading of R2P as
including responses to natural disasters (instead of highlighting the military
junta’s response to the cyclone as a crime against humanity), the junta could
delay the delivery of humanitarian aid and influence the conditions under which
this occurred.
The case of Myanmar impacted the debate on R2P in twoways, thus contributing
to the understanding of critical junctures of norms of protection investigated in this
special issue. First, the case refocused R2P on its original core (i.e., the four core
crimes).5 Second, the case revealed the counterproductiveness of using R2P as a dis-
cursive frame to build support for a humanitarian cause.6 Consequently, in the
aftermath of the crisis, the reference to Myanmar was used by those advocating
a narrow reading of R2P.
European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 18, No. 4 (2012), pp. 719–742; Elvira Rosert and Sonja
Schirmbeck, “Zur Erosion internationaler Normen: Folterverbot und nukleares Tabu in der Diskussion”,
Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2007), pp. 253–287.
4. The military junta renamed Burma only in 1989. Even though many still use “Burma” (or “Birma”),
“Myanmar” has been the name officially recognised by the United Nations since 1989. For clarity, this
study refers only to Myanmar.
5. These four core crimes are genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. See
paragraph 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document: A/Res/60/1, “World Summit Outcome”
(New York: United Nations, 24 October 2005). See also the careful analysis of the World Summit nego-
tiations by Murthy and Kurtz in this issue.
6. Similar arguments have been made by Badescu and Weiss and by Haacke: Cristina G. Badescu and
Thomas G. Weiss, “Misrepresenting R2P and Advancing Norms: An Alternative Spiral?”, International
Studies Perspectives, Vol. 11, No. 4 (2010), pp. 354–374; Jürgen Haacke, “Myanmar, the Responsibility
to Protect, and the Need for Practical Assistance”, Global Responsibility to Protect, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2009),
pp. 156–184. This article contributes to these findings a more fine-grained analysis of the arguments
exchanged in the international dispute and describes the impact with greater hindsight. Furthermore,
this article is part of a special issue that compares all critical junctures in the evolution of R2P. In addition,
this article does not share the characterisation of R2P as “misused”, “misapplied” or “misrepresented” in
the case of Myanmar, as Badescu and Weiss claim. Rather, it analyses the arguments of both supporting
and contesting actors and views the dispute as formative for advancing an understanding of R2P
without attaching normative labels.
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This article proceeds in three steps. First, it provides a brief overview of the
events of May 2008, when Cyclone Nargis hit the shores of Myanmar. Second,
the article describes and systematises the two main disputes related to R2P in
this case. Finally, the article analyses the impact of those disputes on the future
debates on R2P.
Cyclone Nargis and the Question of Coercive Aid Delivery
Since the military coup d’état that ended democratic rule in Myanmar in 1962, there
have been frequent reports of grave human rights violations against ethnic min-
orities—like the Karen, Chin and Rohingya peoples—and political dissidents.
These include the internal displacement of about a million persons, extrajudicial
killings and torture, forced labour, the use of child soldiers and systematic sexual
violence.7 These incidents did not receive sustained international attention until
the violent crackdown on peacefully demonstrating Buddhist monks and civilian
actors during the Saffron Revolution of 2007.
It was not until the military junta refused to grant international humanitarian aid
access to those regions whose shores were devastated by Cyclone Nargis on 3 May
2008 that some international actors began invoking R2P.8 With that, Myanmar
became the first country in Southeast Asia subject to a debate on R2P.9 The
debate on Nargis is the focus of this article. It does not discuss the discrimination
and persecution of the Rohingya and Karen, which have attracted greater attention
in the last three years and have been targeted by measures of the newmass atrocity
prevention agenda of the current United States administration.10
In Myanmar, the Irrawaddy delta region was hit hardest by Nargis. The death
toll was about 140,000, and the cyclone left 1.5 to 2 million people severely
affected.11 The military authorities, who spoke through a body called the State
Peace and Development Council, were neither able nor willing to cope with the
unfolding humanitarian crisis. The regime was completely isolated from the
outside world and preparing for an important referendum.12 The latter contributed
to an atmosphere of fear—of internal opposition as well as of external pressure,
particularly from Western NGOs and international organisations present in the
7. For an overview of the history of repressions by the military junta, see International Coalition for the
Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP), “The Crisis in Burma—Update Report”, 2014, available: <http://www.
responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-burma> (accessed 20 March 2014).
8. There were some minor exceptions: some non-governmental organisations (NGOs) like the Fédéra-
tion Internationale des Droits de l’Homme referred to R2P with regards to the violent crackdown on the
Saffron Revolution. But this did not provoke a notable, sustainable international debate.
9. Haacke, op. cit., p. 157.
10. Julian Junk, “The Two-Level Politics of Support: The United States and the Responsibility to
Protect”, Conflict, Security & Development, Vol. 14, No. 4 (2014), pp. 535–564; Sarah Brockmeier, Gerrit
Kurtz and Philipp Rotmann, Schutz und Verantwortung: Über die US-Außenpolitik zur Verhinderung von
Gräueltaten (Berlin: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, 2013).
11. John Holmes, The Politics of Humanity: The Reality of Relief Aid (London: Head of Zeus, 2013), p. 189.
12. The referendum should ostensibly pave the way for a transition to democracy, but from the outset
it was clear that those democratic aspirations remained a façade with military authorities still in the
driver’s seat, though in civilian clothing. For an analysis of those political reform processes in
Myanmar, see Marco Bünte, “Burma’s Transition to Quasi-military Rule: From Rulers to Guardians?”,
Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 40, No. 4 (2014), pp. 742–764. At the time, the regime was heavily criticised
for pressing ahead with the referendum despite the fact that those affected by Nargis would be unable to
participate (Holmes, op. cit., p. 193).
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country. It was only when the authorities realised the scale of the unfolding huma-
nitarian disaster, three days later, that they reluctantly asked for international
assistance.13 But even then, they refused to grant visas to international staff and
allow the entrance of foreign humanitarian aid. They seized two air deliveries
sent by the World Food Programme and deported a Qatari search-and-rescue
team,14 willing to grant limited access only to organisations from neighbouring
states and other Southeast Asian institutions.15
International actors, who were already critical of the military junta, increasingly
called for immediate access to affected areas.16 The humanitarian crisis absorbed
the attention of the United Nations leadership for about two months, and it
resulted in the discussion of four fundamental questions that reverberated well
beyond the Myanmar case. First, how can one deal with an isolationist govern-
ment? Second, what routines can be established to improve coordination
between the UN and regional organisations—in this case, the Association of South-
east Asian Nations (ASEAN)? Third, can R2P be applied in the aftermath of natural
disasters? Fourth, is it possible for R2P to produce the desired results in a region
where some view it as a vehicle of Western dominance?17 This article focuses on
debates that relate to the latter two aspects; it traces the disputes that took place
over the twomonths in question and asks how these disputes affected the trajectory
of R2P.
The debate on whether Myanmar constituted a case for R2P began early, when
then French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner stated on 7 May 2008, “We are
seeing at the United Nations whether we can’t implement the responsibility to
protect, given that food, boats and relief teams are there, and obtain a United
Nations’ resolution which authorises the delivery [of aid] and imposes this on
the Burmese government”.18 Kouchner argued that the international community
had a responsibility to impose humanitarian relief because the rising death toll
was a sign, in R2P language, of the Myanmar authorities’ manifest failure to
protect their citizens.19
Thus, it was the behaviour of the military junta, rather than the natural disaster
per se, that was at the heart of Kouchner’s reasoning. Nevertheless, the debate on
13. Miki Honda, “Natural Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance in Asia: The Case of Myanmar”,
GIARI Working Paper 2009-E-4 (Tokyo: Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration/Waseda Univer-
sity, 2009), p. 2.
14. Graeme Jenkins and Sebastien Berger, “UN Launches Appeal as Burma Refuses Aid”, The Tele-
graph, 9 May 2008, available: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/burmamyanmar/
1942422/Myanmar-cyclone-UN-launches-appeal-as-Burma-refuses-aid.html> (accessed 10 April 2014).
15. Naim Kapucu, “Collaborative Governance in International Disasters: Nargis Cyclone in Myanmar
and Sichuan Earthquake in China Cases”, International Journal of Emergency Management, Vol. 8, No. 1
(2011), pp. 12–15.
16. Whether there were legal obligations for Myanmar to grant this access is contested among scholars
of international law. See, for instance, Craig Allan and Thérèse O’Donnell, “A Call to Alms? Natural Dis-
asters, R2P, Duties of Cooperation and Uncharted Consequences”, Journal of Conflict & Security Law, Vol.
17, No. 3 (2012), pp. 337–371.
17. See also Holmes, op. cit., p. 190.
18. Seth Mydans, “Myanmar Faces Pressure to Allow Major Aid Effort”, The New York Times, 8 May
2008, available: <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/08/world/asia/08myanmar.html> (accessed 10 April
2014).
19. Tyra R. Saechao and Sujeet B. Rao, “Aid for Myanmar—Op-Ed”, The Washington Times, 30 May
2008, available: <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/may/30/aid-for-myanmar/> (accessed
10 April 2014).
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R2P in the Myanmar case increasingly focused on whether natural disasters are
part of R2P’s triggers for coercive international action. It was, however, highly
unspecific regarding operational details and focused instead on the broader
scope of R2P as well as on the political consequences of using the R2P frame in a
disputed case. The next section analyses these disputed issues, the arguments
and the actor coalitions.20 The two disputes will be analysed by systematising
their arguments and proponents and assessing their impact on the evolution of
R2P. Sources used for the analysis are official documents, secondary literature
and expert interviews.21
The Dispute on the Scope of R2P
Three main arguments about scope can be identified. First, a humanitarian crisis
resulting from a natural disaster constitutes a direct case of R2P, if the affected gov-
ernment passes the threshold of manifest failure. Second, the humanitarian conse-
quences of natural disasters should be confronted with determined international
political pressure to end the humanitarian crisis, and not with the procedures
enshrined in R2P, nor with related rhetoric. Third, the consequences of natural dis-
asters are never a case of R2P because they do not constitute a threat to inter-
national peace and security and do not fall under any of the four core crimes;
they can be dealt with at the regional level.
Argument 1: Natural Disaster as a Case of R2P
Proponents of the first argument state that a government withholding aid to parts
of its population following a natural disaster manifestly fails in its responsibility to
protect its citizens.22 As such, the subsidiary responsibility of the international com-
munity should be invoked, and coercive means are justified.
Thus went the reasoning of Bernard Kouchner in his 7 May 2008 statement. But
Kouchner was unspecific about what the invocation of R2P would mean, beyond a
United Nations Security Council resolution demanding cooperation from
Myanmar.23 His initially implicit call for forceful intervention was made explicit
in an article for Le Monde on 19 May,24 and by statements from Jean-Maurice
Ripert, the French ambassador to the UN, who claimed that France “could send
20. For the common framework and terminology of this special issue, see the introduction by Kurtz
and Rotmann.
21. The interviews were conductedwith diplomats and scholars fromMay to July 2013 inWashington,
DC, Paris and New York, and by phone or Skype. The expert interviews were semi-structured. Most
interviewees spoke only on the condition of anonymity. Therefore, there are only a few direct references
to these interviews in this article. To assess the impact of the Myanmar case on the evolution of R2P, this
article analyses the two sessions of the General Assembly that followed the events in Myanmar (i.e., the
63rd and 64th sessions) to check whether and to what extent the link between Myanmar and R2P was
made and how this link was interpreted.
22. On the exact compromise language of the World Summit Outcome Document, see Murthy and
Kurtz in this issue.
23. Doug Bandow, “Rangoon’s Renaissance: Commentary”, Cato Institute, 7 May 2009, available:
<http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/rangoons-renaissance> (accessed 10 April 2014).
24. Bernard Kouchner, “Birmanie: morale de l’extrême urgence”, Le Monde, 19 May 2008, available:
<http://www.lemonde.fr/asie-pacifique/article/2008/05/19/birmanie-morale-de-l-extreme-urgence-par-
bernard-kouchner_1046630_3216.html> (accessed 10 April 2014).
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men” to Myanmar, as the French navy was soon to be present off of its coast, and
that France historically knew when to apply R2P.25 This reference relates to the
French narrative that the country’s aid workers and philosophers set the ground-
work for R2P with the term droit d’ingérence humanitaire, loosely translated into
“humanitarian interventions”. Kouchner is credited as one of the founding
fathers of this concept in the French discourse, in which a forceful response to a
humanitarian crisis seems to be a given once the concept is invoked.26
Accordingly, Kouchner and Ripert stood their ground when demanding a forceful
international response, even if the coalition in support of this argument remained
quite limited in number; even French President Nicolas Sarkozy did not publicly
back it.27 Given these circumstances of realpolitik, the French ended up asking
only that John Holmes, then UN under-secretary-general for humanitarian affairs
and emergency relief coordinator, brief the Security Council and proposed a presi-
dential statement calling on Myanmar to allow unhindered humanitarian access.
The former request was granted; the presidential statement was rejected.28
While this weak French follow-up to Kouchner and Ripert’s demands is indica-
tive of their arguments’ lack of international traction, there were some voices that
backed the forceful proposal. For instance, Lloyd Axworthy, the former Canadian
foreign minister, said in response to Kouchner that “there is no moral difference
between an innocent person being killed by machete or AK-47, or starving to
death, or dying in a cholera pandemic that could be avoided by proper inter-
national responses”.29 Thus, according to his reading, the global community
should exercise its responsibility to protect. Ramesh Thakur, a former member of
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS),
which wrote the report that coined the term “responsibility to protect”, similarly
added that the ICISS report included “overwhelming natural or environmental cat-
astrophes” as one of the triggers of R2P, should a state rebuff aid or prove unwilling
or unable to cope with the disaster.30 Hence, according to this reading, the whole
story of how R2P came to be, and not just the outcome document, should be con-
sidered in arguing for the inclusion of natural disasters.
Thakur’s quote is more specific about the threshold at which withholding aid
constitutes a case of R2P. Some argued that Myanmar passed this threshold.
ICISS Co-Chair Gareth Evans, for instance, said, “When a government default is
25. Haacke, op. cit., p. 164.
26. Interview with Daniel Vosgien, French Foreign Ministry, French Focal Point for R2P, 28 June 2013,
Paris. See also Mely Caballero-Anthony and Belinda Chng, “Cyclones and Humanitarian Crises:
Pushing the Limits of R2P in Southeast Asia”, Global Responsibility to Protect, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2009),
p. 140; Sarah Brockmeier, Gerrit Kurtz and Julian Junk, “Emerging Norm and Rhetorical Tool: Europe
and a Responsibility to Protect”, Conflict, Security & Development, Vol. 14, No. 4 (2014), pp. 429–460.
27. Jean-Marc Châtaigner from the French Foreign Ministry pointed this out during an interview in
Paris on 28 June 2013, and he added that this was a Kouchner cause without broader backing from
the French political elite, the Quai d’Orsay and the French public.
28. Caballero-Anthony and Chng, op. cit., p. 141.
29. Lloyd Axworthy, “International Community Has a Responsibility to Protect Myanmar”, The
Edmonton Journal, 13 May 2008, available: <http://www.canada.com/story.html?id=6056af9d-43eb-4575-
81b3-9235750e3214> (accessed 10 April 2014).
30. Ramesh Thakur, “Crisis and Response”, Yale Global Online, 19 May 2008, available: <http://
yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/crisis-and-response-%E2%80%93-part-i> (accessed 10 April 2014). Also
quoted in W. Andy Knight and Vasselin Popcski, “Putting People Ahead of Protocol”, The Edmonton
Journal, 4 June 2008, available: <http://www.canada.com/edmontonjournal/news/ideas/story.html?id=
0f041843-446d-4fce-b650-b3c904487a93> (accessed 10 April 2014).
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as grave as the course on which the Burmese generals now seem to be set, there is at
least a prima facie case to answer for their intransigence being a crime against
humanity—of a kind which would attract the responsibility to protect principle”.31
But the academic debate about the validity of this threshold argument remained
controversial. While some argued that the government of Myanmar fell short of
the threshold,32 others concluded that even though the threshold might have
been passed, a chronological sequencing of the instruments of R2P from diplomatic
to military means, itself a controversial assumption,33 was not followed.34
Argument 2: Non-Application of R2P, But Forceful International Action
After the initial attention received by the first argument, the international debate
soon focused on arguments that avoided using R2P language but are nevertheless
relevant to the broader debate on the scope of norms of protection that is outlined
in the introduction to this special issue. The second argument went like this: a gov-
ernment that withholds aid to parts of its population in the aftermath of a natural
disaster might not meet its responsibility to protect its own citizens, but the subsidi-
ary responsibility of the international community cannot be invoked because the
aftermath of natural disasters goes beyond the four core crimes covered by R2P.
Nevertheless, the humanitarian disaster should be an international concern that
demands determined international pressure to allow the delivery of humanitarian
aid to those in need.
The legal reasoning behind these arguments was as follows: any decision within
the UN system to act coercively needs to be based on a formal Security Council res-
olution. As will be described later in this article, even a narrow reading of R2P often
hits a contested path in the Security Council, but a wider reading would comp-
lement the need for protecting those at risk with the wider theme of whether
there is a threat to regional and/or international peace and security.35 This is not
without precedent. In the case of Rwanda in 1994, the Security Council based its
decision to deploy a temporary multinational force on the reasoning that the “mag-
nitude of the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and secur-
ity in the region”.36 In its 2000 resolution, in which the Security Council affirmed its
commitment to the protection of civilians in armed conflict, the council specifically
emphasises that one of the threats to international security is the hindrance of
humanitarian personnel’s access to civilians.37
31. Gareth Evans, “Facing Up to Our Responsibilities”, The Guardian, 12 May 2008, available: <http://
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/may/12/facinguptoourresponsbilities> (accessed 10 April
2014). For similar quotes from other actors, see Knight and Popcski, op. cit.
32. Rebecca Barber, “The Responsibility to Protect the Survivors of Natural Disaster: Cyclone Nargis, a
Case Study”, Journal of Conflict & Security Law, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2009), p. 3.
33. See Tourinho, Stuenkel and Brockmeier in this issue.
34. Ashley McLachlan-Bent and John Langmore, “A Crime against Humanity? Implications and Pro-
spects of the Responsibility to Protect in theWake of Cyclone Nargis”, Global Responsibility to Protect, Vol.
3, No. 1 (2011), p. 37.
35. See, for instance, Luis Peral, “Humanitarian Crisis as a Fresh Justification for International Action
in Syria”, ISS—European Union Institute for Security Studies, 20 February 2012, available: <http://www.
iss.europa.eu/de/publikationen/detail/article/humanitarian-crisis-as-a-fresh-justification-for-
international-action-in-syria/> (accessed 10 August 2015).
36. S/Res/929 (New York: United Nations, 22 June 1994).
37. S/Res/1296 (New York: United Nations, 19 April 2000). For more examples, see Peral, op. cit.
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Most European governments implicitly alluded to those precedents when they
made their case for forceful international action. For instance, the British
government, through its UN ambassador at the time, John Sawers, stated clearly
that R2P did not apply to natural disasters.38 Then British Foreign Minister
David Miliband added, however, that “all instruments of the UN should be avail-
able”, including military force,39 but that diplomatic pressure was the preferred
strategy.40
The German government, in line with other members and institutions of the
European Union,41 highlighted the need for sustained diplomatic pressure.
Although Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, the German minister of development at
the time, invoked R2P in the case of Nargis, she appears to be an isolated voice
in the German government.42 German Chancellor Angela Merkel and German
Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier called for decisive action by the UN,
but they did not include references to R2P43 and remained reluctant to involve
Germany any further in Myanmar.44 In the aftermath of the debate on Nargis,
the EU, driven by the Swedish government, called for the criminal persecution of
members of the junta—but without any direct reference to R2P.45
The US government avoided references to R2P, but was more open to coercive
aid delivery.46 Zalmay Khalilzad, then the US permanent representative to the
UN, came close to mentioning R2P when he stated that “a government has respon-
sibility to protect its own people … since it’s not able to, you would expect the gov-
ernment to welcome assistance from others … It should be a no-brainer to accept
the offer made by the international community, by states, by organizations, by
international organizations”.47 From the perspective of Myanmar authorities,
who were wary of any, but in particular Western, foreign influence, it was certainly
not a no-brainer, but a rational move. In order to achieve the aim of delivering
humanitarian aid, Washington subsequently avoided language that could be
38. Quoted in Thakur, “Crisis and Response”, op. cit. See also Brockmeier, Kurtz and Junk, op. cit.
39. See Bandow, op. cit.
40. Jonathan Marcus, “World Wrestles with Burma Aid Issue”, BBC News, 9 May 2008, available:
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7392662.stm> (accessed 10 April 2014). See also Brockmeier,
Kurtz and Junk, op. cit.
41. High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, for instance,
declared that the international community “should use all possible means to get aid through to
victims of Myanmar’s cyclone”, as quoted in Security Council Report (SCR), “Update Report No. 4:
Myanmar”, 14 May 2008, available: <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/update-report/lookup-c-
glKWLeMTIsG-b-4130257.php> (accessed 10 April 2014).
42. Süddeutsche Zeitung, “Wieczorek-Zeuk: UN sollen Hilfe koordinieren”, 13 May 2008; Süddeutsche
Zeitung, “Birmas Junta brüskiert Vereinte Nationen”, 10 May 2008.
43. Süddeutsche Zeitung, “Birmas Junta brüskiert Vereinte Nationen”, op. cit.
44. As the former German ambassador to the UN highlighted in an interview, Germany was rather
focused on its immediate backyard, like the situation in the Balkans. Interview with Thomas Matussek,
Berlin, 22 March 2013.
45. See Honda, op. cit., p. 4.
46. Julian Borger and Ian MacKinnon, “Bypass Junta’s Permission for Aid, US and France Urge”, The
Guardian, 9 May 2008, available: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/may/09/cyclonenargis.
burma> (accessed 10 April 2014). In general, the US appears to be open to coercive aid delivery in the
aftermath of natural disasters, but only if those vulnerabilities are created or strengthened by the gov-
ernment in the affected country. Interview with Gideon Maltz, National Security Staff, Washington,
DC, 21 May 2013.
47. Quoted in Haacke, op. cit., p. 164.
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perceived as taking advantage of the situation in order to induce regime change in
Myanmar.48
However, some US officials continued the tactic of rhetorically criminalising
Myanmar’s behaviour without specifying the legal basis for this criminalisation.
Former US Defence Secretary Robert Gates, for instance, condemned Myanmar’s
behaviour as “criminal neglect”.49 Similar to the US government’s response was
that of Australia: “Forget politics”, said then Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, “forget
the military dictatorship. Let’s just get aid and assistance through to people who
are suffering and dying as we speak, through a lack of support on the
ground”.50 Again, no reference to R2P was made; instead, a call to forceful inter-
national action.
One central reason for the avoidance of R2P language in these cases was fear of
its counterproductive consequences. This will be described in greater detail in the
next section, for it sparked a separate debate. However, the main argument under-
lying this counterproductiveness argument is that, as outlined above, Myanmar is
not an R2P case, a position that has been widely taken by influential scholars and
advocates.51
Argument 3: Non-Application of R2P, But a Regional Concern
While most Western governments argued for international pressure but not for the
invocation of R2P, Asian voices were more sceptical of involving international
bodies like the UN Security Council and argued for a regional response instead.
According to this logic, there is a local and regional responsibility to act, and
there is no room for Western-dominated, sabre-rattling responses. R2P references
were directly rejected. The ASEAN, for instance, voiced scepticism about
Western aid delivery and emphasised regional responsibility (not to protect, but
to discuss access for humanitarian help).52 Myanmar seemed receptive to accepting
aid workers from ASEAN nations.53
Similarly, China, Russia and South Africa claimed that Myanmar did not pose a
threat to international peace and security. Therefore, it was not a concern of the
Security Council, but a regional matter.54 These countries rejected Kouchner’s
48. Ibid., p. 169. Comments by former First Lady Laura Bush initially gave the impression of an
ongoing regime change agenda, as Haacke points out.
49. Allan and O’Donnell, op. cit., p. 370.
50. Quoted in Haacke, op. cit., p. 164.
51. Marcus, op. cit.; UQ News, “New UQ Centre Gives Key Advice on Burmese and International
Response to Cyclone—UQ News”, The University of Queensland, 23 May 2008, available: <http://
www.uq.edu.au/news/article/2008/05/new-uq-centre-gives-key-advice-burmese-and-international-
response-cyclone> (accessed 20 March 2014).
52. For an institutional analysis of the ASEAN response, see Julia Santiago Amador III, “Community
Building at the Time of Nargis: The ASEAN Response”, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol. 28,
No. 4 (2009), pp. 3–22.
53. Michael Moran, “Two Tragedies, Two Responses: Inhumane Reaction by Regime in Myanmar”,
The Council on Foreign Relations, 25 May 2008, available: <http://www.cfr.org/burmamyanmar/two-
tragedies-two-responses-inhumane-reaction-regime-myanmar/p16340> (accessed 10 April 2014). See
also Caballero-Anthony and Chng, op. cit.; Kapucu, op. cit., pp. 12–15.
54. Charles E. Ziegler, “Contesting the Responsibility to Protect”, International Studies Perspectives
(2014), doi: 10.1111/insp.12085, p. 9. See also Donald Steinberg, “Responsibility to Protect: Coming of
Age?”, Global Responsibility to Protect, Vol. 1 (2009), p. 437.
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reference to R2P55 and viewed it as an attempt to expand the scope of the norm.56 In
addition, there was deep scepticism about Western countries’ selective use of R2P
and, in particular, of its coercive means. Indonesia, on the council at the time
and generally supportive of R2P, was deeply sceptical of invoking R2P in the
Myanmar case and was in favour of a regional response.57 Similar were the pos-
itions of Thailand, Singapore,58 Vietnam59 and South Africa.60 India provided
help early on but deliberately took a low-key approach to it.61
For China, Myanmar represented an important shift—not with regard to R2P, but
because China publicly criticised Myanmar for the first time62 and even facilitated
international diplomatic good offices. This shift had already started during the
Saffron Revolution but intensified with the events following Nargis.63 China was
deeply critical of what it perceived as French belligerence in the case of Nargis—
exemplified when the Chinese representative to the Security Council drew compari-
sons between Myanmar’s reaction to Nargis and the French government’s response
to the 2003 heatwave that, by some estimates, killed 11,000 French citizens, more
than any previous heatwave.64 In general, China preferred a regional, diplomatic
approach. It was strictly against neither an international diplomatic interference in
Myanmar,65 nor R2P—but it was strictly against the notion that R2P applies in the
case of failed responses to natural disasters.66 China emphasised that the UN and
regional organisations have other processes and means for coordinating the delivery
of humanitarian aid.67
In sum, the analysis of this first dispute has revealed the dominance of those
arguing that the Myanmar case does not fall within the scope of R2P. The
55. Roberta Cohen, “The Burma Cyclone and the Responsibility to Protect”, Speech at Congressional
Briefing on Security for a New Century, Brookings, 21 July 2008, available: <http://www.brookings.edu/
research/speeches/2008/07/21-myanmar-cohen> (accessed 10 April 2014).
56. SCR, op. cit.
57. Ibid., p. 3; Alex J. Bellamy and Sara E. Davies, “The Responsibility to Protect in the Asia-Pacific
Region”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 40, No. 6 (2009), pp. 559–560.
58. Bellamy and Davies, op. cit., p. 564.
59. Honda, op. cit., p. 6.
60. Festus Aboagye, “South Africa and R2P: More State Sovereignty and Regime Security than Human
Security?”, in HSF, ISS, KAS and SAIIA, The Responsibility to Protect: From Evasive to Reluctant Action? The
Role of Global Middle Powers (Johannesburg: Hanns Seidel Foundation [HSS], Institute for Security Studies
[ISS], Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung [KAS], South African Institute of International Affairs [SAIIA], 2012),
p. 33.
61. Madhan Mohan Jaganathan and Gerrit Kurtz, “Singing the Tune of Sovereignty? India and the
Responsibility to Protect”, Conflict, Security & Development, Vol. 14, No. 4 (2014), pp. 461–487. For a dis-
cussion of Indian and Chinese policies towards Myanmar and how different perceptions of R2P contrib-
uted to this, see Alain Guilloux, “Myanmar: Analyzing Problems of Transition and Intervention”,
Contemporary Politics, Vol. 16, No. 4 (2010), pp. 383–401.
62. Tiewa Liu, Haibin Zhang, Ricardo Soares de Oliveira and Yi Zhang, “Debates in China about the
Responsibility to Protect as a Developing International Norm: A General Assessment”, Journal of Conflict,
Security & Development, Vol. 14, No. 4 (2014), pp. 403–427.
63. Sarah Teitt, “Assessing Polemics, Principles and Practices: China and the Responsibility to Protect”,
Global Responsibility to Protect, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2009), pp. 208–236.
64. Caballero-Anthony and Chng, op. cit., p. 141.
65. Bellamy and Davies, op. cit., p. 557.
66. R2RAsiaPacific, “Cyclone Nargis and the Responsibility to Protect: Myanmar/Burma Briefing No.
2”, Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 16 May 2008, available: <http://www.
responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php?module=uploads&func=download&fileId=539> (accessed 10
April 2014).
67. Ibid., p. 9.
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reasons for their stance were twofold: first, a rather normative objection based on a
different legal reading of R2P; and second, a more interest-based objection based on
a preference for either non-involvement or for leaving the issue to regional actors.
These two reasons were sometimes interwoven (e.g., the statements of the Chinese
officials), and shifting the debate from “crimes against humanity” towards “natural
disaster response”was certainly helpful in that framing contest.68 A similar pattern
emerges when investigating the second dispute. But first, we will analyse the
impact of the dispute on scope.
Impact of the Dispute on Scope
The impact assessment reveals that once the link between R2P and Myanmar was
made, it was used to highlight the affirmed focus on the four core crimes as stated
in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. Representative69 of this focus are
two quotes from UN General Assembly-level records. As a summary of debates
in the International Law Commission shows, most states accepted that R2P, to
the extent that it justified intervention, did not extend to intervention “in the
event of disasters”, for the idea of intervention could be abused by powerful
states “for their own purposes … Mention had been made of Myanmar as a
model to be avoided”.70 According to further statements, R2P should not be
invoked “if a government fails to meet its obligation to protect its people in the
event of a natural disaster”, as in the Myanmar case, where “there were other
requirements under international humanitarian law that imposed the duty on
the Government to care for its people, and there had been agreement to put
pressure on the Government to do so”.71 Hence, Cyclone Nargis was used primar-
ily as a frame that highlighted the incorrect invocation of R2P.
This interpretation of the case seemed to be set in stone, until recently, when the
issue of coercive delivery of humanitarian aid was discussed again with regards to
Syria,72 even with reference to Myanmar.73 Although the nature of the
humanitarian tragedy differs markedly between the two cases (the case of
Syria involves armed conflict with “starvation of civilians as a method of
combat”,74 not a natural disaster), political repression plays a crucial role in both
68. Thanks to one anonymous reviewer for suggesting that this point be highlighted.
69. For other similar quotes, see Official Record of Sixty-third Session of the General Assembly, 99th
Plenary Meeting on 24 July 2009 (document: A/63/PV.99); Summary Record of the 21st Meeting of the
Sixth Committee of the General Assembly on 22 December 2009 (document: A/C.6/64/SR.21); Tenth
Session of the Human Rights Council with the Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General
on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, 5 March 2009 (document: A/HRC/10/13/Add.1).
70. See the debate on the protection of persons in the event of disasters at the 62nd session of the Inter-
national Law Commission on 1 July 2010, in which the rapporteur, Stephen Vasciannie from Jamaica,
summarised parts of the debate (document: A/CN.4/SR.3057, p. 7).
71. See the Parliamentary Hearing at the United Nations on 20–21 November 2008 as quoted as a
summary of the debate in the General Assembly document A/63/729 of 20 February 2009, p. 6.
72. Danny Postel and Nader Hashemi, “Use Force to Save Starving Syrians”, The New York Times, 11
February 2014, p. A27. Interviews in New York at the UN also revealed that those arguments exist,
though not yet with high-level public support and operational planning.
73. Xing Qu, “The UN Charter, the Responsibility to Protect, and the Syria Issue”, China International
Studies, Vol. 33 (March/April 2012).
74. S/Res/2139 (New York: United Nations, 22 February 2014). See also Aron Lund, “The Failure to
Stop Starvation Tactics in Syria”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 31March 2014, available:
<http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=55172> (accessed 17 August 2015).
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instances, and the legal arguments for coercive delivery of aid and for the counter-
productive effects of the R2P frame are remarkably similar. Peral, for instance,
argues that the direct invocation of R2P might politicise the debate to an extent
that it impedes any international agreement on pressuring the Syrian government.
Nevertheless, the population under threat should be subject to norms of protection.
Therefore, he advocates “the customary principle of providing basic needs to
deprived populations, whatever the causes of such deprivation”, and by doing
so, one would “avoid invoking crimes for which the regime might be held respon-
sible”, which should then be subject to future investigations.75 Thus, the debate on
the scope of the norms of protection, even if only partially related to R2P, continues.
An analysis of the UN documents on the organisation’s public debates in the
aftermath of Myanmar, however, reveals no quotes that followed up on the argu-
ments defending the invocation of R2P in this particular case and, more generally,
in the case of natural disasters. A reason for this might be that the battle to define
the lowest global common denominator of the scope of R2P had been fought
before. As referenced in the aforementioned Thakur quote,76 the original ICISS
report included the direct consequences of natural or environmental catastrophes
as one of the triggers of R2P, but subsequent documents—the World Summit
Outcome Document in particular—no longer made this reference. This was a con-
scious decision, as revealed by Murthy and Kurtz’s careful assessment of the World
Summit deliberations in this issue. Obviously, most of the actors cited in this article
as being sceptical of extending the scope had similar reservations before.77 Refer-
ences to Myanmar gave them the chance to reiterate this perspective and to
make sure that the 2005 compromise on the scope of R2P, with its focus on con-
flict-related core crimes, remains the dominant reading of R2P.
The Dispute on the Expediency of the R2P Frame
The dispute on the scope of R2P dominated the debate and, as shown, was itself
dominated by those who were sceptical of invoking R2P in the Myanmar case.
There was a related dispute on the politicising effects of R2P. This dispute can be
divided into two camps: the first is mindful of the negative political consequences
of invoking R2P; the second highlights its positive effects. The following analysis
reveals that the former dominated the dispute.
Argument 1: Counterproductiveness of the R2P Frame
Those who believe the R2P frame is counterproductive in the given political cir-
cumstances reason that by invoking R2P, debates on aid delivery become politi-
cised and overshadowed by ongoing, highly principled disputes about military
interventions and sovereignty. This would hurt not only the aim of helping those
in need, but also the international acceptance of R2P.
John Holmes said he was sceptical that an invasion “would be helpful to the
people we are actually trying to help”.78 He viewed the R2P discussion and
75. Peral, op. cit.
76. Thakur, “Crisis and Response”, op. cit.
77. Interview with an anonymous source close to the UN.
78. Bandow, op. cit.
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coercive measures for delivering seemingly apolitical humanitarian aid as
unnecessarily confrontational and as potentially undermining the UN’s main argu-
ment in negotiations with the military regime.79 Similarly, British and German dip-
lomats involved in negotiations in New York pointed out the non-coercive, neutral
nature of humanitarian aid.80 Douglas Alexander, then British cabinet minister for
international development, rejected any public debate about R2P in this context as
incendiary.81 In addition, then German ambassador to the UN Thomas Matussek
emphasised that the German government viewed the French rhetorical escalation
as deeply counterproductive to the aim of helping civilians: “This delayed the
delivery of humanitarian aid by several weeks”.82
Because the United States was already overstretched militarily in Afghanistan
and Iraq, government officials tried to focus on the delivery of humanitarian aid
by diplomatic pressure and not by coercive means.83 Like the British, the US did
not invoke R2P to avoid a political escalation. “It is not a matter of politics,” said
then US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. “This is a humanitarian crisis.”84
In general, as the Security Council Report stated, “France’s attempt to invoke
[R2P] to put pressure on the Myanmar government seems to have strengthened
opposition to the Council acting in this way”.85 For instance, Liu Zhenmin, then
Chinese ambassador to the UN, demanded the creation of “favorable conditions
for the humanitarian relief inMyanmar without politicizing this issue”.86 Indonesia
shared the view that invoking R2P would not help those in need and would under-
mine the delivery of humanitarian aid.87 Thakur and Evans made similar argu-
ments and warned that invoking R2P in this case could dramatically undercut
the international consensus on its use88—a consensus that was fragile even
before the Myanmar crisis.89
Argument 2: Expediency of the R2P Frame
The aforementioned argument is countered by a more positive view of R2P
framing. According to this counterargument, the invocation of R2P and the accom-
panying possibility of aWestern-led military intervention politicised debates on aid
delivery to such an extent that the military regime felt pressured to allow access to
international aid. But this reading of the expediency of the R2P frame for the cause
of those who advocate the delivery of international humanitarian aid and, ulti-
mately, for those in need of this aid appears to be an academic debate at the
margins. Haacke, for instance, claimed that invoking R2P “played an important
part in addressing the crisis more effectively, namely as a rhetorical device. From
79. Thakur, “Crisis and Response”, op. cit.
80. Brockmeier, Kurtz and Junk, op. cit.
81. Thakur, “Crisis and Response”, op. cit.
82. Interview with Thomas Matussek, Berlin, 22 March 2013.
83. Thakur, “Crisis and Response”, op. cit.
84. Mydans, op. cit.
85. SCR, op. cit.
86. Zhenmin Liu, “Remarks at the Meeting on the Launching of the UN Flash Appeal in the Wake of
the Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar by OCHA”, 9 May 2008, available: <http://www.china-un.org/eng/
hyyfy/t451098.htm> (accessed 14 October 2015).
87. Bellamy and Davies, op. cit., p. 560.
88. Thakur, “Crisis and Response”, op. cit.; Evans, op. cit.
89. Ramesh Thakur, “Operationalising the ‘Responsibility to Protect’”, The Hindu, 15 February 2008.
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a Western perspective, reference to [R2P] increased the political pressure on [the
military junta] to become more responsive to international concerns” and
“proved crucial in propelling ASEAN into assuming the role of facilitative”.90
By and large, however, the counterproductiveness argument dominated the
discourse.
Impact of the Counterproductiveness Dispute
Analysing the General Assembly documents reveals no clear evidence that the
failed attempt to invoke R2P in theMyanmar case led to amore cautious use in sub-
sequent cases (see the other case studies in this special issue, e.g., the Russian–Geor-
gian war, the crises in Sri Lanka and Libya). Hence, a long-lasting impact of the
second dispute (i.e., R2P as an incendiary frame) seems to be non-existent.
However, as demonstrated by the case of Kenya in another study in this issue,
the similar concern that the emotionalisation of a situation by raising the R2P
flag can have negative consequences is frequently voiced.91 In addition, interviews
with American92 and European93 diplomats reveal that the events in Myanmar and
Kenya in 2008 contributed to bringing the strategic dimension of using the R2P
frame into the limelight. Thomas Matussek, the former German UN ambassador,
put it most pointedly: “We Germans learned from the events in Myanmar: if we
want to prevent those humanitarian atrocities, we should, under certain circum-
stances, avoid the label R2P … Each time, when the US argued in the direction
of R2P, the usual R2P sceptics of G77, China, India and Russia lined up”.94
Indeed, some Chinese scholars still refer to the Myanmar case to highlight that
threatening with R2P and coercive measures is unhelpful and should be avoided
in similar instances, like in Syria.95 Although there were hardly any direct state-
ments made during UN debates that reiterated the counterproductiveness argu-
ment, there is evidence for a more careful use of the R2P frame after the events
in Myanmar. This is not to say there have been no instances of the R2P flag
being prominently raised (see Libya). But Western diplomats in particular seem
more cautious about invoking R2P since then.
Concluding Remarks
The analysis of the main disputed issues in the case of Myanmar illustrates that two
arguments were dominant, in the sense that they were backed by a large and
powerful coalition of actors. According to these arguments, the invocation of
R2P in the Myanmar case was neither justified (natural disasters do not fall
90. Haacke, op. cit., pp. 169–174. For details on the media pressure, in particular of images of devas-
tation, on Western governments, see Gabi Schlag, “A Buddha to Protect: Nargis and the Visual Politics
of Security”, in Monica Juneja and Gerrit Jasper Schenk (eds.), Disaster as Image: Iconographies and Media
Strategies across Europe and Asia (Regensburg: Schnell + Steiner, 2014), pp. 137–146.
91. Susan E. Rice, “Remarks on the UN Security Council and the Responsibility to Protect—Inter-
national Peace Institute Vienna Seminar, 15 June 2009”, United States Mission to the United Nations,
2009, available: <http://usun.state.gov/remarks/4347> (accessed 14 October 2015).
92. See also Junk, op. cit.
93. See also Brockmeier, Kurtz and Junk, op. cit.
94. Interview with Thomas Matussek, Berlin, 22 March 2013.
95. For more on the Chinese debate, see Qu, op. cit.
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under its scope) nor politically helpful for delivering humanitarian aid (it politi-
cised the topic and made face-saving compromises more difficult as critical time
passed for those most severely affected by the storm and the regime’s inaction).
These objections to invoking R2P had two roots: first, different interpretations of
the norm, which argues that only the four core crimes can serve as triggers for
R2P-based interventions, particularly in coercive form; second, the hesitation of
actors to be drawn into an intervention or their geopolitical concerns regarding
Western dominance in R2P matters.
These arguments influenced future debates on R2P in two ways. First, they
served as a reference point for those arguing in favour of excluding natural disas-
ters from the scope of R2P, even though at least the coercive delivery of aid seemed
to be on the table again, during the case of Syria. Second, an unsuccessful invoca-
tion of R2P and its broad contestation did not make the norm fail or weaken it, but
sharpened its contours. Thus, a deeper understanding of the events unfolding after
Cyclone Nargis helps to explain why the debate on R2P solely focused on the four
core crimes in the years afterwards and why there was greater reluctance to invoke
R2P when it could potentially be counterproductive for the cause of protecting
those threatened by atrocities.
The events in 2008 had additional consequences. They triggered institutional
reforms within ASEAN, which increased its capacities to set up relief operations
after natural disasters more effectively.96 Furthermore, the events contributed to
ending the isolationism of Myanmar by forcing the regime to recognise its limits
in confronting humanitarian catastrophes like Cyclone Nargis—thereby making
it apprehensive of losing legitimacy—and by enabling national and international
NGOs to move more freely, which served as the first crack in the wall of control
held by state authorities.97
However, it did not prevent Myanmar from becoming again the focus of a debate
on an international responsibility to protect a minority at risk. The fate of the Rohin-
gya and other marginalised ethnic groups will reveal whether Myanmar authorities
and international actors have learned their lesson on the opportunities and chal-
lenges of invoking R2P.
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